Prior to Covid, the pilot shortage was recognized as a looming challenge by industry groups such as ATAC, but it remained one that was still relatively manageable. With the loss of many pilots due to reasons that vary from early retirement to simply changing careers, and the reduction of new Commercially Licensed Pilots graduating from flight schools caused by the shutdown of many schools during Covid, the pilot shortage has been further exacerbated, temporarily.
The major carriers are having difficulty recruiting pilots at the experience level they were accustomed to (evidenced by lowered requirements), and this is rapidly having a trickle down effect to the regionals and all the smaller (702, 703, and 605) operators. Historically, pilots who graduated with their CPL/multi-IFR or similar have gone first to these smaller carriers, then the regionals and finally the majors. This has contributed to the stellar safety record at the 704 and 705 (regional and major air carrier) level that has lasted for decades due to the experience of those pilots. That experience was often earned in northern and remote operations in both difficult weather and on difficult runways, and it helped to ensure that those individuals were ready to assume command on the larger more complicated aircraft after they operated from the First Officer position for a few years.
The expansion of many air carriers, and an aging & relatively cohesive pilot cohort approaching retirement, is also contributing to the need for pilots. Pilots are being recruited with less and less experience. The implications for safety, and adjustment to training techniques/timelines, are obvious. The question is, what can be done to mitigate this potential problem?
The College of Professional Pilots believes that part of our mandate is to assist in the transition from newly licensed Commercial Pilot to a pilot that works in a multi-crew aircraft for a regional or major air carrier. We plan to do this on several levels; through mentorship, a flight school initiative that assists with CRM and SOP training, educational material available on our website, and by promoting professional standards. Mentorship will be available for College Members at every level who will be matched to a mentor that is knowledgeable in the type of flying the Member would like to pursue. Flight schools who promote the College to their students will be given generic SOPs that use industry best practices. Assistance with multi-crew CRM and SOP training will be to ensure a smoother transition into complex 2 crew aircraft. The rigors of flying in difficult conditions will be addressed through education, and the examples of personal standards will be discussed along with realistic expectations and positive reinforcement of best practices.
The goal is to achieve the same or better level of safety that our industry has enjoyed over the last few decades by working together with flight schools, the air carriers, and the other stakeholders. Achieving this goal is key to our industry remaining strong and protecting our reputation as professionals and fostering trust for our occupation in the eyes of the traveling public.
Every year, the month of May signifies graduation for post-secondary students. For newly minted pilots outside of modular programs who may be graduating from 2,3, or 4 year college or university aviation degree programs, it is a time of celebration and of apprehension.
It is a market reality that at the low-end of the pilot experience spectrum, there are more sub-250hr CPL pilots than there are positions for them. Main factors behind this are those of safety (sometimes, there is no substitute for experience), regulatory, (e.g. 250hrs total time required to hold a type rating on 2-crew aircraft), insurance limitations, and the combination of types flight operation (e.g. seasonal, VFR, adhoc charter) and the (small, single-pilot) aircraft well-suited to those missions.
Large cohorts graduating at the same time flood the pilot market at the low-experience end, exacerbating the challenges for these individuals to become employed as pilots soon after their studies. Consequently, and in our market system, it is to be expected for operators to take advantage. Ground-to-flight programs, ramping, training bonds, vague promises of a flying position in exchange for working in other positions after a period; are familiar to all except those looking to start a flight training program.
Commentary on pilots exiting the profession, pilot-ramp positions, training bonds, wages and working conditions, or the economics of a small operator, are not the purpose of this op-ed, but they are certainly consequences of what this article is highlighting.
That is, clearly, the current state of affairs post-pandemic and in the midst of a pilot shortage of sorts (has it finally come to pass?!) results in even poorer outcomes for safety, for pilots, and for operators than even a decade or two ago.
Time away from flying, large debt loads, poor remuneration, outright unemployment, precarious living situations to name a few, are not conducive to safe pilot-decision making, lead to adverse long-term health and lifestyle choices, and are detrimental to industry and professional growth in the larger scheme. One may conclude that given free-market principles leading to a lack of leverage for new pilots, at the root, one must limit the number of new pilots produced. To be clear, unlike some other professional bodies, this is not the position of the College. While it certainly would be the “nuclear option”, the impracticality—and the author would argue, question of ethics—of implementation and the spectre of unintended consequences loom large.
Instead, given adequate pilot support, an organization like the College of Professional Pilots can be instrumental in effecting more realistic and relevant changes to the above status quo to the benefit of the profession and individual pilots, and arguably, operators as well.
For starters, providing early education on the realities of the profession and career support from the day an individual decides to embark on a pilot career is foundational. So many groups may offer a small scholarship, or promote a visible minority, or offer targeted mentoring (“look, somebody like you did it, you can do it too!”). These well-intentioned efforts are haphazard overall, and are offered in an insular manner without regard to the industry picture in which the pilots will find themselves but a tiny dot upon completion of their flight training.
Beyond networking, mentorship, and being a representative for the interests of the profession, forearming pilots with an impartial assessment of the state of the industry and of the profession, outcomes are less likely to be shocking and discouraging, and pilots would enter the workforce more resilient to workforce realities. This additional time to prepare and adjust their thinking could just make the difference in ensuring pilots who by ability, preparation, and perseverance, achieve the better outcomes they deserve. A professional College endeavours to holistically support the entire development and progression of pilots, because at every stage, the skills, standards, and professionalism of each commercial-level pilot affects us all.
To that effect, the College is going right to the source. The flight schools that produce our fledgling flocks have always had their traditional set of challenges. To these are added the relatively recent and novel problem of a lack of instructors, and high instructor turnover leading to an inability to build up a solid foundation of training experience. One can easily see how this is another negative to the profession and to individual pilots; while operators will soon see the consequences of that if they haven’t already.
Concretely, for this initiative, the College is reaching out to flight schools coast to coast. It is high time to start tackling the challenges of training, experience, progression, professionalism, and every other aspect which affects the piloting profession. No other stakeholder group, operator group or even regulator, are putting time into addressing the underlying structural problems in a coordinated, coherent fashion, at great accumulated cost to the Canadian aviation industry and everyone in it. By being the impartial body to draw flight schools and operators together, needs of industry can be better connected with pilot production, and the voice of flight training becomes more relevant in industry and to the regulator when we approach them for much needed changes to archaic (and arbitrary!) requirements. The College’s initiative on the PICUS program is an example of work in that direction.
Lastly, by reaching new commercial pilots at the source, individual pilots will benefit from the networking, shared experience, and industry knowledge as they set forth into “real world” operations. It is also at this vulnerable time they could benefit most from a voice to represent their interests and effect positive changes with the regulator and other stakeholders to improve outcomes in early-career and facilitate reaching their goals with a minimum of undue pain.
Ground to Flight Program versus Signing a Training Bond
The ink on your Commercial Pilot Licence and IFR booklet is still wet. Your scan the web and see employment opportunity in either a 12 month Ground to Flight Line Program and an opportunity to fly immediately by signing a $20,000 Training Bond. The choice is obvious; Right?
I was at Flight Safety for two weeks of simulator type training with other Canadian pilots who each had signed $20,000 Training Bonds as new hires for identical simulator type training as me. Ground school chatter detailed how their new type-training would advance their career into a mainline 705 carrier within a year. My costs to attend two weeks at Flight Safety included $2,000 airfare, $3,000 lodging, $2,000 meals and $23,000 for the training. This all expense paid program was a bargain for each of them signing a $20,000 training bond, while receiving both a salary and all expenses paid. Their choice was obvious: Right?
Canada’s Aviation Rite of Passage
The ground crew to the flight line program was Canada’s traditional aviation rite of passage. An Air Operator hired us to perform specific manual labor where they screened, molded, mentored, and eventually invested financially in advanced technical and flight training in their current aircraft model or type. This rite of passage insured there was a good probability of a good ROI (Return on Investment) to the air operator and to the pilot.
Training Bond Culture as a Return on Investment (ROI)
Recently, a Training Bond culture has evolved as a credit shortcut option for new pilots to the flight line who have invested $150,000 and at least twelve months to earn the minimum CPL/IFR qualification. The Training Bond culture became a necessity for Human Resource managers when the pilot shortage, increasing training costs and subsequent new hire pilot turnover created a negative ROI to their employer.
Newly qualified pilots see the Training Bond as bypassing Canada’s traditional aviation rite of passage, seeking a credit short cut with this contract. Each operator training bond is unique with several contract clauses that require legal discernment. Examples may include:
– $20,000 is for the full term or
-$20,000 prorated over the term
– what is the non-disclosure clause
– how broad is the non-competition clause
– can you be let go without cause
New qualified pilots see the Training Bond as the opportunity to log time immediately. Many new pilots have signed and may not have considered the financial exit strategy should the employment relationship go sour without a signed Employment Contract document that may have:
⁃ no employment separation clause
⁃ no employment pay scale
⁃ no duty or flight schedule.
⁃ no assigned domicile
Newly qualified pilots should always attend an in-person interview and view the presented training bond before they pay out for any airfare, any apartment rent or give notice where they currently work.
Training Bonds are financial investments defining the operator/pilot relationship. The operator expects a positive ROI (Return on Investment) over the term of the bond.
Remember; the training bond is a corporate economic tool for the operator to maintain their ROI and manage pilot turnover costs. If you engage in a training bond, assure yourself the bond price is reasonable for the type of training and qualification you are receiving.
Captain Pilot Proficiency or Co-pilot Competency Training
What is the Difference ? Qualification ? Training ? Cost ? Portability ?
Most CARS 703 Operators fly single pilot aircraft that must have a captain with a Pilot Proficiency Check (PPC) flight check on the specific model with Transport Canada within the last 12 months. Some operators also choose to have co-pilots on these single pilot aircraft for a variety of operational or contractual reasons. Co-pilots are required to be trained to a Pilot Competency Check (PCC) level with an operator designated captain. Operator flight training is either done to a Captain proficiency, or a Co-pilot competency standard. The financial investment and return on investment difference for each is significant for both the pilot and the operator.
The Captain ground and flight training have specific direct costs allocated to the Training Bond including:
⁃ costs such as company indoctrination ground school
⁃ costs such as aircraft type technical ground school
⁃ variable costs for 4-5 flight hours of designated syllabus training such as night circuits, IFR missed approaches with a qualified training captain etc.
⁃ the aircraft model PPC check flight (1.5 hrs) and Transport Canada ACP fees
However, most in house Co-pilot ground and flight training only include the following syllabus;
⁃ Shared costs such as company indoctrination ground school
⁃ Shared costs such as aircraft type technical ground school
⁃ Minimal costs such as on flying empty charter legs with a training pilot
Only the Captain’s flight test by a Transport Canada approved check pilot (ACP) is portable or transferrable within the industry. The Co-pilot’s training and flight check is company restricted and is not transferable within the industry. Each Training Bond should reflect the either the costs or the portability / transferability value within the industry. A co-pilot competency check ROI may be valued by the operator at $5,000; while the proficiency check and flight check ROI may be valued at $20,000. “
Newly qualified pilots will continue to find air operators advertising either “Ground to Flight” or “Training Bond” entry programs. Know the difference between these career entry programs.
Michael Graham operated Missionair as a 703 operator for 13 years. Missionair continues to provide PA31-350 simulator training in Manitoba. Michael contributes as a board member of College of Professional Pilots Canada
Bridging the Gap II (200++ hours to 500 hours)
You are a new commercial pilot with 200++ hours having invested over $150,000 and over fifteen months earning your CPL (Commercial Pilot License). Your online research for flying job seems to require a minimum of 500 hours total time. As a new CPL pilot, your transition from Flight School operations to commercial air taxi operations will be a significant “Bridging the Gap” cultural experience missing from your resume. What gives? Let me share my experiences and opinion as a former Piper Navajo employer and CARS 703 trainer since 1996.
April 23, 2007, the Winnipeg Queens Bench court room was packed. Spring 2007 will be etched in the Canadian aviation legal journals. I was called as the Crown’s opening expert witness for Transport Canada. On trial for “Criminal Negligence” causing death was an air taxi company pilot of 16 months previously employed as a flight instructor. My testimony of my previous employment with the same operator, Air Taxi Operations in general and the PA31-350 Navajo specifically was pivotal to the Transport Canada case against the pilot. Mr. Tayfel’s defence lawyer Balfour Der would initially grill me personally on the witness stand regarding the Transport Canada published SATOPS report findings. The defence focused on the lack of supervision by the CARS 703 air taxi operator that contributed to the death of a passenger in the crash of C-GPOW. TSB report “A02C0124 Fuel Exhaustion – Collision with terrain Keystone Air Service Ltd. Piper PA 31-350 Navajo Chieftain .. 11 June 2002”. Management pressures to dispatch against common sense was evident, but the Air Taxi Operator was not on trial here. In my opinion, the root cause issue of this CARS 703 tragedy was the lack of a Co-Authority Dispatch within this CARS 703 air taxi organization.
Your new CPL acknowledges you have been trained to meet stringent piloting skills to proficiency levels. Each training flight or rental was operated within a form of Co-Authority Dispatch. Your knowledge requirements were measured following months of commercial ground school. Your CPL ground school study syllabus touched on your general knowledge of CARS 703 Air Taxi operations on pages 12 and 13 of TP 12881E (Revised 02/2018) Study and Reference Guide for written examinations for the Commercial Pilot Licence Aeroplane Sixth Edition. Daily, your flight school screened your aircraft mechanical fitness, the local weather and your pilot limitations for your scheduled flying lesson or aircraft rental before releasing you as a CPL student. Your flight school tried to instill within you the concept of “Personal Minimums” in coordination with instructors and management. This co-authority dispatch or safety net is rarely found within the Canada CARS 703 Air Taxi operations. Remember; your online research for flying job seems to require a minimum of 500 hours total time.
Statistically, Transport Canada regulates 36 domestic (CARS 705) Airlines, 80 domestic Commuter (CARS 704) carriers and 466 domestic (CARS 703) Air Taxi operators. Canadian Air Regulations requires all CARS 705 airlines and CARS 704 commuter organizations to utilize the co-authority dispatch utilizing Transport Canada qualified flight dispatchers. “Co-authority dispatch” definition – “means the shared authority, between the pilot-in command and the flight dispatcher in a Type A or B operational control system, for decisions respecting the operational flight plan prior to acceptance of the operational flight plan by the pilot-in-command”. Knowledge, understanding and application skills required for the Transport Canada Flight Dispatcher FDOPS and FDMET exams are referenced in TP 12513 Study and Reference Guide – Flight Dispatchers.
Many CARS 703 Air Taxi operations that employ CPL pilots are permitted by regulation not to require the industry co-authority dispatch. The safety of air taxi operations is a documented Transport Canada issue for at least three decades. The Canadian Air Regulations as we know them came into law on October 10, 1996. On September 11 & 12, 1996, Transport Canada had the initial meeting of a “Safety of Air Taxi Operations” (SATOPS) Task Force. The SATOPS Steering Committee met on October 4, 1996. A industry consultation working group meetings were scheduled between January 10 and February 22, 1997. The draft SATOPS report was completed by March 14,1997 and the Final SATOPS report completed by March 31, 1997. This SATOPS final report over 25 years old will be referenced later.
My own corporate 1996 application for a CARS 703 Air Taxi Operating Certificate under the new Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) included a submission and TC approval of the Company Operations Manual (COM). My CARS 703 Air Taxi COM and likely every 703 COM manual approved since paraphrases CARS 723.16 (1) (b) as:
“Responsibility and Authority Operational control is delegated to the pilot-in-command of a flight by the
Operations Manager who retains the responsibility for the day-to-day conduct of flight operations.”
December 9, 1997 (Within 8 months) I attended the emergency room at the Winnipeg Health Science Center that preceded the TSB report “A97C0236 Collision with terrain Sowind Air Limited, Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante C-GVRO”. “The chief pilot, who was the occurrence captain, had been chief pilot for seven days at the time of the accident.” I would be contracted to re-train the remaining pilots. Through out the re-training my opinion was that management pressures to dispatch against common sense was evident. In my opinion, the root cause issue of CARS 703 delegated “pilot self dispatch” was central to this tragedy.
College of Professional Pilots of Canada
“The College of Professional Pilots of Canada began in 2008 when group of pilots from the industry united after a 2007 conviction of a fellow pilot who crashed an aircraft after running out of fuel, killing one passenger. They met not only with this incident in mind but also to discuss the current state of the industry and its future, with focus on having a pilot be a professional.
It was agreed that the best natural progression of the profession should be to have certification of a professional pilot’s licenses and credentials to a self-governing model. This, like most other professional organizations, would mean that pilots would be governing and licensing themselves.
This led to the registration of a not-for-profit corporation in early 2009 and shortly after its first official meeting.” (Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia)
CARS 703 Air Taxi training introduces both the 200+ and 500+hour CPL pilots to “pilot self-dispatch” authorizing among examples: 15-hour duty days, special VFR operations, scud running, lower take off and landing minima calculations than ever published, operational pressures including minimum equipment operations, ground icing and inflight ice operations, customer expectations and more. The CPL “personal minimums” established during your flight school days will be challenged daily.
2019 Transportation Safety Board (SII Safety Issue Investigation)
The Transportation Safety Board (TSB) also recognizes that CARs 703 Air Taxi operations are a unique sector in the aviation industry, where the air-taxi sector provides a diverse array of air services to Canadians. The TSB published Air transportation safety issue investigation report A15H0001 on 7 November 2019 titled “ (SII Safety issue investigation) Raising the bar on safety: Reducing the risks associated with air-taxi operations in Canada”. Section 6.4 and 6.5
6.4 The safe operating envelope
“The safety themes that emerged from the industry consultations were fitted into a model adapted from the safe operating envelope initially developed by Cook and Rasmussen.260 This model was selected as a way to illustrate how the safety themes, the context, and the competing pressures inherent in the air taxi sector interact. The model showed the interaction between the 3 kinds of pressures observed in the data:
Sector pressures are operational hazards that increase the level of risk and are part of the context of air‐taxi operations. They can and should be planned for and managed before a flight takes off.
Operating pressures significantly increase the risks within the air‐taxi sector and are tied to the day‐to‐day demands of efficiency in a financial and a workload sense.
Safety pressures counteract the sector and operating pressures, mainly based on actions carried out before a flight.”
6.5 Raising the bar on safety
“To improve safety in the air‐taxi sector, the 2 main underlying factors contributing to air taxi accidents (acceptance of unsafe practices and inadequate management of operational hazards) must be addressed differently than in the past. A system‐wide, combined effort by all stakeholders is necessary.”
My opinion that the CARS 703 industry has yet to recognize that delegated “pilot self-dispatch” as the root cause of many accidents in the plethora of CARS 703 TSB reports and CADOR reports. CARS 703 operational control and responsibility must not be delegated to the least experienced in the organisational structure but remain with the organisation’s accountable executive!
“The definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over and expecting different results.” -attributed to Albert Einstein
Michael Graham is currently a College of Professional Pilots of Canada board member bringing operational experience and training insight to the new commercial pilots entering the industry.
References
TP 12881E (Revised 02/2018) Study and Reference Guide for written examinations for the Commercial Pilot Licence Aeroplane Sixth Edition.
TP 12513 Study and Reference Guide – Flight Dispatchers –
Transport Canada’s Advisory Circular (AC) No. 604-004
CARS 604.180 POC Flight Dispatcher training syllabus SOR/2014-131, s. 18
TSB report “A97C0236 Collision with terrain Sowind Air Limited, Embraer EMB-110P1 Bandeirante C-GVRO”
TSB report “A02C0124 Fuel Exhaustion – Collision with terrain Keystone Air Service Ltd. Piper PA 31-350 Navajo Chieftain” .. 11 June 2002
Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia College of Professional Pilots of Canada
TSB report “A15H0001 SII Safety issue investigation) Raising the bar on safety: Reducing the risks associated with air-taxi operations in Canada” .. 7 November 2019